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1. Introduction 
The relation between law and ethics has been a perennial problem in social and political 
philosophy. One can even argue that the major division within the field of Western legal 
philosophy, i.e. the division between legal positivism and the natural law theories stems from 
a disagreement over whether legal normativity is conceivable as independent of ethical 
normativity. The history of the debate between natural law theories and legal positivism is 
too long and the positions taken in this debate turn out to be too intricate to be presented in 
detail here. However, for the purpose of this introduction, a focus on Immanuel Kant is 
sufficient; although the significance of role he played in the development of ethics and 
political philosophy cannot be exaggerated, he nevertheless seems to present a position 
concerning the nexus between ethics and law which is so intricate that even his most 
dedicated readers cannot agree on which construal is most accurate.  
 
A particularly controversial issue within Kant studies is how we are to make sense of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, the work in which Kant presents his political and legal philosophy in 
the most systematic and elaborate fashion. One can argue that, if this difficult work did not 
exist, we would probably consider Kant as a figure proposing only a reconstruction of the 
political sphere, both national and international, along the lines of the ethics of autonomy he 
vindicated as being of universal validity. The Metaphysics of Morals, by contrast, introduces 
a sharp distinction between the sphere of justice and law (Rechtslehre) and the sphere of 
virtue (Tugendlehre). The following turns out to be the troublesome question then:  how are 
these two spheres related, or are they related at all?  
 
It is then no surprise that the Metaphysics of Morals, and particularly its first part, the 
Doctrine of Right, has usually been glossed over even by those who claim to be following the 
Kantian heritage or his critical outlook in the field of social and political philosophy. More 
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recently, however, Kant’s text has received a great deal of attention. Unlike Schopenhauer 
who attributed the problem of interpretation to Kant’s old age, contemporary authors 
devoting their time to the reading of the Metaphysics of Morals should think that the 
difficulties in this work arise because Kant had insight into the distinctive natures of justice 
and law, on the one hand, and, on the other, ethics, an insight which was not liable to clear 
articulation. Despite the recent interest in Kant’s text, the controversies over the meaning of 
his argument have increased. Hence, the Metaphysics of Morals still stands as a puzzling text 
for many. This special issue includes works by Kant scholars, who elaborate on different 
aspects of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals and point out methodological and substantive 
avenues for the resolution of difficulties we come across there. As the reader will see, the 
answers offered by our authors are not always congruent with each other; however, each 
provides insights derived from years of immersion in Kant’s philosophy and each is worth 
being further pursued.     
 
 
2. Kant’s Legal Philosophy and Its Problems 
In his paper, Thomas Mertens presents an overview of the difficulties Kant’s Metaphysics of 
Morals engenders in a way that intends to be particularly helpful for those who are 
“beginners” to Kant’s text. The first of the difficulties is the problem of the “independence 
thesis”. Mertens thinks that at least one way of understanding the categorical character of 
normativity is that the moral law excludes any normativity derived from elsewhere. However, 
this is precisely what Kant appears to be suggesting in the Doctrine of Right, namely that 
there can be no simple derivation of legal normativity from ethical normativity. Drawing 
upon Marcus Willaschek’s “independentist” interpretation of Kant, he argues that juridical 
laws cannot be both external and prescriptive at the same time. This means that the 
independence thesis suggests that Kant’s conception of law was not very different from the 
Kelsenite conception of law as a system of norms founded upon a basic norm.  
 
The second problem, which Mertens calls the problem of legal positivism, is closely 
connected to the first one. Here the question is whether Kant subscribes to the Hobbesian 
motto of auctoritas non veritas facit legem. In Mertens’s view, the Kant of the Doctrine of 
Right that insists on our almost unconditional duty to obey the authority that has power over 
us seems to respond affirmatively to this question. Then, the difficulty is how we are to 
square Kant’s insistence on the autonomy of the moral agent in his ethics with such a duty of 
obedience to the state authorities.  
 
The third problem concerns what we call today human rights or basic individual rights. 
Mertens points out that, although Kant is often hailed as the arch-father of human rights, 
because of his emphasis on human dignity, and although he seems to ground the idea of law 
on an idea we might consider to be capturing the core aspects of human rights in a nuclear 
form, namely, the freedom as the innate right of humanity, a closer reading of Kant’s text will 
reveal that he is far from acknowledging many of the most fundamental civic and political 
rights. Indeed, Mertens suggests, Kant had very little room for the idea of pre-positive or 
supra-positive rights; even the innate right to freedom amounted more to the recognition of an 
equal status, rather than entitlement to rights with substantive content.  
 
In light of the fact that Kant is more concerned with the idea of law than substantive 
subjective rights, it turns out that he might not be the liberal thinker he is often portrayed to 
be. As Mertens maintains, it is undeniable that the concept of freedom is pivotal to Kant’s 
entire philosophy as well as to his political and legal philosophy particularly. However, two 
problems come to the fore when Kant is read as a liberal thinker. First, it is not clear to what 
conception of liberty – a negative one favoured by liberals or a positive one favoured by 
republicans – Kant subscribes. Second, it is also not clear whether he suggests a “political 
liberalism” or a “comprehensive liberalism”, as John Rawls famously distinguished them, at 
the level of politics. Furthermore, Kant does not sound very liberal when he starts to talk 
about the rights of women and citizens that do not own property.  
 
The last but not the least problem is that of consistency. Mertens suggests that there are 
tensions and even contradictions between Kant’s arguments in the Doctrine of Right written 
at the end of the 90s and the arguments he presents in the political and historical writings 
between the 80s and the mid-90s.  
 
In the face of all these difficulties, Mertens suggests, the best thing to do is “to interpret 
Kant’s doctrine of law in such a manner that is as consistent as possible with Kant’s general 
conception of moral philosophy, and…[to take] into account Kant’s earlier legal and political 
writings” . He stresses that this suggestion includes reviving the teleological understanding of 
history found in the earlier writings. He then concludes his paper by pointing out three 
avenues – themes which originate in different parts of Kant’s legal philosophy, but need to be 
developed by integrating them with other parts of Kant’s moral and political philosophy: 1) 
Kant’s arguments for the separation of the states and the rejection of a world republic, which 
should be developed along the lines of a conception of the states as the contexts not only for 
the duties of right but also for the duties of benevolence; 2) Kant’s arguments concerning 
marriage, the elaboration of which will bring out how much his legal philosophy depends 
upon his ethics, particularly his views about sexual relations in this case; and 3) Kant’s 
argument for “honeste vive” as the first duty of right, which can be best elaborated as the 
duty to moral integrity, displaying the unity of law and ethics in Kant. 
 
3. Kant’s Practical Philosophy and the Innate Right to Freedom 
Contrary to what Mertens suggests, Sari Kisilevsky presents an interpretation of Kant’s legal 
and political philosophy focused on the Doctrine of Right and appreciating the independence 
thesis. Following in the footsteps of Arthur Ripstein’s influential exposition of Kant’s legal 
philosophy, Kisilevsky takes Kant’s conception of freedom as independence, i.e., the innate 
right of humanity, as the ground of Kant’s legal and political philosophy. She argues that her 
interpretation slightly differs from Ripstein’s in that, while the latter begins with the concepts 
of coercion and the general will, she directly begins with the notion of freedom as 
independence.  
 
In her representation of Kant’s concept of innate right to freedom, Kisilevsky emphasizes that 
the fundamental function of this concept is to “vindicate the equal and distinct standing of 
each to choose and act for herself”. Concomitant to this is a separation between “the person” 
and her particular needs, desires, or interests, on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
particular needs, desires and interests of the people around her. Hence, the innate right to 
freedom leads to a principle of right that is strikingly abstract and formal. She also notes that 
this abstract and formal principle has the status of a final court of appeal, i.e., plays the role of 
a trump over any substantial ethical consideration concerning contested issues at the political-
legal level. Then, she argues, the question is why Kant thought such an abstract and formal 
principle should be held prior to substantive political values and goods that a political 
community might specify and advance, and even prior to the substantive political rights that a 
state should specify and protect. 
 
Kisilevsky suggests that what matters for Kant is the distinction between the juridical 
solution of conflicts and the arbitrary solution of them. The latter is a condition where the 
private judgment of one person or one group prevails over the others’. No matter however 
such a judgment might seem to be fair for all, i.e., compatible with everyone’s rights as far as 
its substance is considered, the condition is a state of violence considered formally. On the 
other hand, if a public authority is instituted and this public authority decides upon the issues 
as the omnilateral will of each citizen as an independent person, the condition is that of 
justice and peace, whatever the substance of the decision might turn out to be. In this vein, 
Kisilevsky argues, Kant centres political philosophy on the notion of right as a formal-
juridical ideal, while leaving open the substance of these rights and the interests and values 
underlying these rights.      
 
To further clarify why freedom as independence requires the establishment of a public 
authority, Kisilevsky suggest that we should contrast Kant’s freedom as independence with 
slavery. This is evidently reminiscent of Philip Pettit’s strategy to present his republican 
conception of freedom as non-domination. Kisilevsky notes that although there is some 
similarity between Pettit’s freedom as non-domination and Kant’s independence, the former 
is different from the latter in that it refers to the interests of the ruled as the standard of the 
distinction between domination and legitimate ruling compatible with freedom as non-
domination. On the other hand, she notes, Kant thinks that it is the fact that a public order 
provides authoritative standards for action that relieves people from subjection to one 
another, rather than the fact that the public order protects their substantive interests.  
 
Having argued that freedom as independence is an artefact of law and is wholly explained by 
law, Kisilevsky discusses whether it has any independent moral significance. She responds 
affirmatively. She argues that freedom as independence releases persons from the burden of 
being publicly accountable for their failure to uphold others’ needs, desires, wishes, and 
inclinations. It establishes that people can be held accountable only when their actions thwart 
one another’s publicly protected freedom and only by the state.  
 
In the end, Kisilevsky concludes that although it does not provide a complete picture of all 
that politics is about, freedom as independence, which demarcates the limits of personhood as 
a being that can be held accountable for her actions, serves as a morally sound foundation for 
the resolution of fundamental conflicts in politics.  
 4. Kant’s Complex Relation of Dependence between Ethics and Right 
Sorin Baiasu sheds new light on the controversies between dependentist and independentist 
readings of Kant’s legal philosophy on the basis of certain claims from his Doctrine of Virtue. 
Baiasu’s argument is indeed built upon a thesis he already developed elsewhere. There he 
argued that dependentist and independentist readings can be reconciled because there was 
indeed a relation of “complex dependency” between ethical and juridical norms in Kant. His 
thesis of complex dependency was based on a distinction between the objective validity of 
norms and subjective validity of norms, a distinction he thinks underlying, or suggested by, 
Kant’s argument that all lawgiving has two parts: a norm (an objectively valid norm) and an 
incentive (a reason for the commitment to the norm on the part of the subject). Then, as far as 
the subjective validity of the legal norms is concerned, the independentist thesis that juridical 
norms cannot be derived from ethical norms is correct; however, when the objective validity 
of norms is considered, juridical norms are derivable from ethical norms through leaving off 
the condition of acting out of ethical motivation and bringing out the requirements of 
externality, being publicly observable, and enforceability.  
 
In the current paper, Baiasu originally argues that when we closely examine some interesting 
claims Kant makes in the Doctrine of Virtue, the complex relation of dependence between 
juridical norms and ethical norms becomes even more complex. More precisely, he thinks 
that independentism might be correct beyond the limited sphere of subjective validity. The 
fountainhead for this contention is the idea that there are “ethical duties” which are not duties 
of virtue in Kant.  Such ethical duties that are not duties of virtue do ground the duties of 
right in a complex way, but the ethical duties of virtue, being imperfect, are independent from 
duties of right. This means that there is not even a complex dependency of duties of right 
upon duties of virtue, but only a relation of simple independence. 
 
Baiasu concludes with several comments that can be inferred from his argument. First, he 
argues that, since there are ethical duties which can in no way ground duties of right, the 
derivation of politico-juridical norms from certain ethical norms (i.e., ethical norms that are 
not duties of virtue) does not take place in virtue of the ethical character of relevant ethical 
norms. Second, politico-juridical norms are derived from certain ethical norms in a complex 
way that withholds the ethical character of relevant ethical norms. Political-juridical norms 
can be derived from ethical norms through freeing the latter from the motivation-condition, 
while the ethical character of an action springs from the motivation that underlines it. That is, 
an ethical or virtuous action is essentially an action springing from respect for law.  
 
As Baiasu highlights, there are then various questions which need to be pursued in the 
attempt to clarify the relation in Kant between ethical and politico-juridical law- or 
normgivings and in the attempt to reconcile the various dependentist and independentist 
interpretations offered by commentators in the literature. First: which feature of ethical 
duties, if not their ethical character, is important for the derivation of duties of right? Second:, 
Baiasu’s complex dependency thesis needs to be qualified since, even from the perspective of 
the objective validity of ethical norms, duties are right are completely independent from 
duties of virtue – what is then the relation of complex dependency that does hold between 
ethical and politico-juridical law or normgiving? Third: there are important complications 
that the distinction between the ethical duties that are not duties of virtue and the ethical 
duties that are duties of virtue will cause in Kant’s schema of duties; one of them is how we 
are to understand the relation between ethical duties and duties of wide obligation – should 
we count all ethical duties or only duties of virtue as duties of wide obligation? Baiasu notes 
that there are perhaps different senses of “ethical” in Kant, which would then be a fourth 
important question for the clarification of this Kantian puzzle.  
 
5. Kant’s Account of Ethics and Right as Dimensions of Freedom 
In his paper for this special issue, entitled ““Only one obligation”: Kant on the Distinction 
and the Normative Continuity of Ethics and Right”, Stefano Bacin, too, argues for the 
complexity of Kant’s view on the relation between ethics and right. Unlike Baiasu, however, 
he accounts for this complexity in light of the historical-philosophical debate on this issue. 
The controversy was between the Wollfian thesis of dependency and the Thomasian thesis of 
independency. Bacin contends that, although Kant embraces certain elements from both of 
these traditional views, he ultimately provides a novel position going beyond both the 
independency and dependency theses.  
 
According to Bacin, Kant’s account is based on the priority of the concept of obligation and 
the idea of freedom of moral subject entailed by the former concept. Right and ethics are 
aspects of the same realm, morality, within which there is a normative continuity of moral 
obligation, as Bacin thinks Kant suggests when he argued “[t]here are various duties though 
only one obligation overall in regard to the totality of duty. This latter has no plural”. Within 
morality, then, we have a differentiation between right and ethics, not because these are 
spheres separated in terms of their normative ground or force, but because there are two 
dimensions of freedom to which the awareness of moral obligation entitles the moral agent. 
First, there is the inner dimension of freedom as the moral agent’s capacity for rational self-
determination, the perfection of which is the function of ethics. Secondly, there is outer 
(inter-personal) dimension of freedom as independence from possible hindrance of the 
subject’s conduct by other agents, the realization and protection of which is the function of 
right. 
 
As a result, Bacin concludes, Kant provides a view that keeps right linked with ethics on the 
grounds of the general account of moral obligation, while avoiding the instrumentalist view 
of right as a form of applied ethics. In this way, we can say, Bacin suggests a reading of Kant 
combining the attractive features of the alternative accounts of Kant’s philosophy of law 
while avoiding their backlashes.     
 
6. Kant’s Account of Moral Necessitation 
Elke Elisabeth Schmidt and Dieter Schönecker dwell upon a section from the Doctrine of 
Virtue, which they think is more problematic than it might seem at a first glance. The section 
in question is: “Episodic section: On the Amphiboly in Moral Concepts of Reflection” . The 
claim that they find striking in this section is the following: “a duty to one subject or another 
is the moral necessitation by that subject’s will”. The problem with regard to this argument is 
that it does not resonate well with Kant’s autonomy-thesis concerning the nature of moral 
obligation, i.e. the thesis that moral obligation is self-necessitation (free self-coercion). On 
their account, there “seems to be at least a tension, if not a contradiction” between the 
autonomy-thesis and the claim of moral necessitation by another human being’s will. 
 
To tackle with this problem, Schmidt and Schönecker revisit Kant’s argument concerning the 
duties to oneself, as it is presented in §§1-2 of the Doctrine of Virtue. Impressively 
highlighting the distinction between being obligated to myself and obligating myself, they 
suggest that both duties to oneself and duties to other persons include self-obligation, that is, 
all duties are duties from myself since what necessitates me is my own practical reason (or 
my own autonomous will) in any case. 
 
Schmidt and Schönecker engage then in a detailed analysis of §16. They first make the point 
that the duties involved in the “moral necessitation by other persons’ will” include both 
narrow and wide duties. They also argue that contrary to a first impression, Kant neither 
speaks of the duties to oneself nor compares them to the duties to others in this passage. In 
the next step, they underline three probable mistakes in interpreting Kant’s argument for 
moral necessitating by others’ will. First, this argument refers only to one of the two elements 
of the moral obligation we have in the case of the duties to others, the other element being 
autonomous self-necessitation out of our respect to the moral law. Second, the human being’s 
duty to another subject cannot be the moral necessitation by that subject’s actual will. Third, 
we can also not interpret this necessitation as arising out of other’s ethical rights, for we 
would then assume that there are the rights of others corresponding to our wide duties, which 
Kant clearly rejects.      
 
Having presented and eliminated the probable mistakes in the understanding of the “moral 
necessitation by another’s will”, Schmidt and Schönecker suggest that the clue to a better 
interpretation lies in getting the sense of “having a duty to a being” right.  Since “having a 
duty with regard to a being”, too, entails an action directed or targeted to that being, we 
cannot simply say that “having a duty to a being” is distinguished by the fact that our 
obligation consists in an action directed or targeted to that being. In light of this, Schmidt and 
Schönecker formulate the difference between “duties to a being” and “duties with regard to a 
being” as follows: “an action is one’s duty to a being if…this being is a given end, i.e., an 
entity with dignity, a person”. Then, it becomes clear why there are duties to myself, since I 
am a person as well, and also there are duties to other persons on the condition that they are 
given in experience. This provides an understanding of Kant’s “moral necessitation by 
another person’s will” in a way that is congruous with his idea that moral necessitation is 
always autonomous necessitation, because what necessitates us in the case of duties to other 
persons is the very end that our own practical reason postulates as an end in itself, as this is 
precisely the same in the case of the duties to myself.  
 
In the final part of their essay, Schmidt and Schönecker suggest that the interpretation they 
propose invokes a new debate concerning whether the human being’s duty to another subject 
is the moral necessitation by a specific subject’s will and its ends, or by another subject’s 
noumenal will as an end in itself. In any case, however, if it is true that Kant had the idea that 
duties to a being arise out of the dignity of person, a being as an end in itself, this will have 
implications for our reading of the Doctrine of Virtue, and perhaps even the Metaphysics of 
Morals, as a whole.  
 
7. Kant’s Account of Duty 
Kenneth Westphal’s contribution to this volume deals with the complicated nature of Kant’s 
theory of duties and their classification into duties of right and duties of virtue, and strict 
duties and broad duties. He argues that the recent Anglophone philosophy has mostly failed 
to understand Kant’s sophisticated account of duties. This is because the factitious 
dichotomies (individual ethics vs. political-social philosophy, deontology vs. teleology, 
universalism vs. contextualism) upon which the recent Anglophone moral philosophy has 
rested evaded the insight that Kant espoused a moral philosophy in which not only ethics and 
justice, but also education were integral dimensions indissolubly linked to each other.   
 
Westphal contends that Kant follows the tradition started with Plato and Aristotle, which 
brings about an understanding of moral life based on what Curren called the ‘Principle of 
Fidelity to Reason’: “we should behave, individually and collectively, in accord with right 
reason (orthos logos), and decide to behave because so acting accords with right reason”. 
This principle holds for both “individual ethics” and “justice”, since it concerns both 
“individual” and “collective” actions. Furthermore, it makes education an essential dimension 
of moral life since we require nurture, upbringing, training, education, and enculturation by 
others, so as to acquire and develop our capacity to reason.  
 
Kant’s tremendous achievement within this tradition lies in the fact that he elaborated what 
the principle of fidelity to reason amounts to in a way that others before him have failed to 
do. Kant showed that to respect reason (rationality) as morality requires is indeed to respect 
persons as “ends in themselves”. This requires us “to think, to decide and act only on the 
basis of reasons, principles, analysis and evidence which one address to all others, so that 
they too can think, decide or act on those grounds and in that way”. This is indeed the 
universalisability requirement, which we can also call “universal communicability” 
requirement in the view of Westphal, who seems to be evidently influenced by Onora O’Neill 
in this respect.  
 
The universalisability or universal communicability requirement is then a test Kant suggests 
for judging what can be held objectively valid in all non-formal, substantive domains.  
However, Westphal argues that this is only one of the two main components of Kant’s moral 
philosophy. The other component is a “practical anthropology”, which is necessary to specify 
any of our duties. As he understands it, practical anthropology is an inventory and assessment 
of the constitutive features of our finite form of semi-rational agency. For instance, by 
employing practical anthropology, we recognize that human action depends upon material 
resources such as air, space, water and food; and we might then assess that human beings 
should be entitled to rights of acquisition, possession and use of such materials.  
 
In light of all these, Westphal argues that Kant’s distinction between strict duties and broad 
duties arises as a result of two-phased procedure of using the universalisability (universal 
communicability) test as a determinate criterion for classifying actions and their objects 
(ends) as permissible, obligatory, or prohibited. The first phase uses the universal principle of 
right and suffices (when, of course, we also take into consideration the basic, constitutive 
features of semi-rational form of existence of homo sapiens) to identify strict duties of 
omissions and commissions. Since this phase leaves us a very broad class of permissible 
actions, we then use, at the second phase, “Contradiction in Willing” test to identify broad 
duties of virtue. Although these duties have latitude in the sense they leave to individuals a 
broad scope of judgment regarding how, when, and to what extent to fulfil them under 
specific contexts they find themselves, they are nevertheless necessary and thus differ from 
other actions which may be entirely elective or optional.  
 
In this way, Westphal provides a perspective to Kant’s moral theory and to his theory of 
duties in particular, which underscores the constitutive purpose of moral practice (i.e., to 
realize and improve our rational nature), the role of judgment in using moral principles and 
rules, and the inter-subjectivity of moral practice disallowing any complete break between 
individual ethics, justice and education (social enculturation).   
 
8. Conclusion 
The focus of this special issue is on the relation in Kant between duties of right and duties of 
virtue. Whether approaching this topic head-on or indirectly by a consideration of significant 
relevant issues, the papers included illuminate in a variety of ways the Kantian account of the 
relation between ethics and politico-juridical philosophy, the implications of such an account 
and the ways other important aspects of Kant’s philosophy fit together into the Kantian 
system. Particularly important for this special issue areis the ways the papers included open 
up new avenues for research and inquiry, either by raising further questions or by 
highlighting problematic aspects of Kant’s thought which are in need of examination and 
resolution. 
 
One theme which seems to run through all the paper is the significance of ethics for Kant’s 
view of politico-juridical norms. To be sure, there is no straightforward legal moralism in 
Kant, but only an affirmation that political normativity cannot be completely divorced from 
ethical normativity, and that a society’s laws are not merely conventions for the sake of 
avoiding conflicts between citizens’ conceptions of the good life, but outward and 
enforceable norms for a genuine justification of conflict adjudications. Making politico-
juridical norms ethics-sensitive is particularly apposite given the current context of normative 
disorientation in public and political life.  
 
To be sure, this suggests a solution, but raises also significant questions given the modern 
context of pluralism. While an ethics-sensitive account of politico-juridical norms may sound 
like a good idea, one of the questions such a solution would need to answer is which ethics 
we are talking about. For even if we assume that we can find a formal, but productive set of 
ethical standards which can be justified to all, there is the further question of the epistemic 
framework within which such a justification would need to be conducted. And even if we 
were to assume that such a framework would be palatable and, again, justifiable to all, there 
would be yet another question concerning the metaphysical presuppositions of such a 
framework. All these questions and some additional related ones will have to be considered 
elsewhere. 
 
